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tax notes state
States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor at Indiana
University Maurer School of Law, and Darien
Shanske is a professor at the University of
California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors argue that, if the federal
government fails to act sufficiently regarding the
COVID-19 budget crisis, states should consider
either real property surtaxes on their wealthiest
residents or partial deemed realization of the
unrealized capital gains of the very wealthy.
The COVID-19 pandemic is precipitating
severe fiscal crises for states and localities.1 This is
occurring as businesses throughout the country
have shut down, unemployment numbers have
skyrocketed, and consumer demand has dropped
significantly. The national economy is likely
headed for a deep economic recession, and state
and local governments are ill-equipped to deal
with the fiscal volatility problem that caused
budget crises during past recessions, including
the Great Recession of 2008.2

This article is a contribution to Project SAFE
(State Action in Fiscal Emergencies).3 In other
essays in this project, we explain steps the federal
government should take to help state and local
governments cope with their looming budget
crises. The federal government is much better
positioned to manage these crises than states and
localities and, ideally, it would act sufficiently to
prevent the need for state and local governments
to cut spending or raise taxes. However, we fear
that the federal government may fail to act
sufficiently, leaving states and localities with the
need to make painful spending cuts, raise taxes, or
both. Here, we make some suggestions for how
states should respond if the federal government
fails to act sufficiently.
Specifically, we argue that the states should
consider adopting partial wealth tax reforms, at
least temporarily, to raise needed revenue to
weather the budget crises. There are at least two
promising options that could be designed and
implemented sufficiently quickly (at least in some
states) to make good policy responses to the crises.
But first, some more background information.
States are subject to balanced-budget constraints
that prevent them from engaging in deficit
spending during economic downturns, whereas
the federal government is not so constrained.4
During economic downturns, state tax revenues
tend to fall sharply, and as such, states can
maintain balanced budgets only by increasing
taxes (and perhaps licensing fees), cutting
spending, or both. Conversely, during the
economic upturns that lead to tax revenue
surpluses, states typically reduce taxes and
increase spending. In particular, social insurance
programs such as Medicaid are subject to

1

See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.

3

2

See David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).

4

Shobe et al., supra note 1.
Gamage, supra note 2.
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spending cuts during economic downturns —
when they are needed most. The COVID-19 crisis
especially highlights the perils of spending cuts as
Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and other
social insurance programs that are vital to
millions now out of work. So the question
remains: How can states and localities better
contend with fiscal volatility, especially in the face
of a looming budgetary crisis?
Ultimately, raising taxes is preferable to
harmful spending cuts to cope with budget crises
5
during an economic downturn. Ideally, tax
increases should be targeted at economic actors
who are better positioned to weather the
economic downturn, and with the increases made
in a way that minimizes the potential for tax
gaming responses or other taxpayer maneuvers
for escaping tax.
Absent administrative constraints, the best
solution would be a one-time wealth tax on state
residents — which is backward-looking in that it
taxes wealth accumulated previously. Hence, it is
less subject to tax-gaming and other detrimental
taxpayer responses. Such a wealth tax should be
designed with a large exemption, so that the tax
would only apply to the wealthiest, who are
generally better positioned to weather the
downturn as compared with others — especially
the beneficiaries of major state spending
6
programs.
Of course, administrative constraints
complicate this story. States do not currently have
a general wealth tax, nor is it likely to be feasible
for them to design and implement a major new
tax quickly enough to offset upcoming budget
shortfalls. Moreover, some states face legal
prohibitions against general taxes on wealth; for
instance, article XVI, section 3, of the New York
State Constitution states that:
Intangible personal property shall not be
taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax
be levied solely because of the ownership
or possession thereof, except that the
income therefrom may be taken into

5

consideration in computing any excise tax
measured by income generally.
Thus, because such a large share of wealth
consists of intangible personal property (chiefly in
the form of financial assets such as stocks and
bonds), any meaningful New York wealth tax
would likely require a constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless, these barriers leave open at least
two promising reform options. The first would be
a new statewide real property tax with a large
exemption level (or circuit-breaker) so that only
the wealthiest residents or businesses would be
subject to it. Such a new tax (or surtax) could
piggyback on the existing administrative
valuations for real property taxes, and thus could
be designed and implemented quickly. Needless
to say, this would only be a quick option in states
without constitutional limits on property tax rates
or with other legal and administrative barriers. In
any case, this proposal could be designed and
implemented as a temporary measure, meant for
raising the revenue needed to weather the
economic downturn.
The second option would be a new tax or
deemed realization measure on the stock of
unrealized capital gains. This could be done in
several possible ways. For instance, the new tax
could consist of a deemed realization of a
percentage (for example, 50 percent) of unrealized
gains that would then immediately be taxed at the
state’s income tax rates, with an exemption so that
this new levy would only apply to the wealthiest
taxpayers. This option would be more difficult to
design and implement and would likely need to
rely substantially on self-reported appraisals —
backed by auditing and penalties — for valuation
purposes. But the revenue potential should still be
reasonably large, and because so much wealth is
constituted by publicly traded securities, neither
self-assessment nor auditing ought to be
7
prohibitively onerous.
By taxing these unrealized gains now, states
would in effect be accelerating what would
otherwise have been future tax payments (at least
in theory, as in practice much of unrealized gains

For elaboration as to why, see Gamage, supra note 2.

6

Daniel Markovits has made a similar proposal at the federal level:
see “A Wealth Tax Is the Logical Way to Support Coronavirus Relief,” The
New York Times, Apr. 21, 2020.
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7

Mark Gergen estimates that 73 percent of the total value of incomeproducing assets are publicly traded securities. Gergen, “How to Tax
Capital,” 70 Tax L. Rev. 1, 22 (2016).
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are never realized or recognized because of
provisions like stepped-up basis upon death).
This is appropriate, because the effect of taxing
unrealized gains now — during the downturn —
would be to at least partially counteract the fiscal
volatility roller coaster by moving revenues to
when they are needed most. In a sense, then, one
might think of the current nontaxation of
unrealized capital gains as a sort of emergency
rainy day fund that the states should now tap.
It could be argued that either of these partial
wealth tax reform proposals (that we explained
above) could cause liquidity problems, even for
the wealthy. Therefore, as a matter of design, the
tax could permit a payment schedule, much like
the deemed repatriation in the Tax Cuts and Jobs
8
Act. Note that such a schedule should contain a
reasonable interest rate because states should
consider then borrowing against this stream of
income to pay for immediate needs.
Another possible objection to a tax of either
type is that the wealthy might simply leave the
state. There is significant economics literature on
9
these issues. We read this literature as implying
that migrations from so-called high tax states
10
have so far not represented a phenomenon that
should overly trouble states considering more
progressive taxation. But however one reads the
literature as to ongoing income taxes, our
proposed tax measures would be a one-time tax
on previously accumulated wealth or gains. Thus,
there should be a minimal behavioral response.
And the argument for those taxes runs deeper
than that they would be broadly progressive and
efficient. Consider that income and wealth
inequality have become increasingly pressing
issues at both the federal and state levels.
Accordingly, recent Pew Research Center polling
reveals that six in 10 U.S. adults believe there is
too much inequality in the country today, and 84
percent of those who see inequality as a problem

8

believe that the government should increase taxes
on the wealthy. Yet states and the federal
government do a very poor job of taxing the true
11
economic income of the very wealthy. For the top
0.1 percent of taxpayers and above, whose
incomes derive primarily from the returns to
owning wealth (rather than from salary or wages),
structural features of state and federal income
taxes make these taxes “so porous as to be largely
12
symbolic.”
In that light, either option — a new statewide
property surtax on the very wealthy or a new
statewide tax on the unrealized capital gains of
the wealthy — would help ameliorate the lack of
effective taxation of the very rich in the years and
decades leading up to the current and looming
economic downturn. This would have been a
good reason to impose these taxes even before the
pandemic. During a pandemic and recession,
these tax reform proposals are thus even more
clearly a good idea. Remember, assuming the
federal government fails to act, there is a zero-sum
game here. Either states and localities must cut
vital services and thereby prolong the recession —
or else avert these cuts by raising tax revenues.
Given the scale of the emergency and the
importance of the states not eating their seed corn
by engaging in overly destructive cuts, it may
ultimately become necessary for them to consider
revenue instruments that are far less from ideal
(for example, gross receipts taxes). But before
contemplating such measures, states should start
with more targeted and better designed policy
options. In that light, we view our proposals for
real property surtaxes on the wealthiest or partial
deemed realization of the unrealized capital gains
of the very wealthy as especially promising. 

IRC 965(h).

9

Cristobal Young et al., “Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the
Elite: Evidence from Administrative Data,” 81(3) American Sociological
Review 421-446 (2016); Joshua Rauh and Ryan J. Shyu, “Behavioral
Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from
California,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
26349 (Oct. 2019).
10

For example, we are not considering what would happen if states
imposed much higher tax rates than they currently do.

11

See Gamage, “Five Key Research Findings on Wealth Taxation for
the Super Rich” (July 27, 2019).
12

Id. (citing Edward J. McCaffery, “The Death of the Income Tax (Or,
The Rise of America’s Universal Wage Tax),” Center for Law and Social
Science Research, Papers Series No. 18-25, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2018)).
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